This short essay contributes to the disagreement between Thomas Nagel and Peter Hacker over the question: What it is like to be a bat.
In his famous work titled “What is it like to be a Bat?” Thomas Nagel aims to find the truth about the ‘substance’ that makes an organism what that organism is. Thus he bases his argument on the idea that there is something that it is like to be a particular thing. (P. 436) He cleverly uses the metaphor of a bat, where he says that if humans were to transform into a bat, their brains would not be wired as the brain of a bat. For this reason, they would be experiencing the life and behavior of bats, but not the mindset. His thinking clearly states that there is some ‘substance’ that makes a particular animal, plant, or human what it is. Through this thinking, Nagel says that humans have subjective reasoning because each only knows what it is like to be them, and since humans are limited to subjective experience, objective reasoning that requires an unbiased perception, is not possible.
Peter Hacker, who is himself influenced by Wittgenstein, claims that Nagel’s argument is conceptually confused: Hacker says that it makes no sense to search after ‘what it is like’ for a person, or a bat. In his article, he does not want to argue that there is nothing it is like to be a human being, but rather that it makes no sense to go after such a question since the answer cannot be known. As Hacker puts it: “It does not matter whether “conscious experience” is understood as “experience had while conscious” or as “experience of which one is conscious.‟ The very expression “There is something it is like for a person to have it” is misconstructed.
My first argument in this paper focuses on the disagreement between the two philosophers. If we are to accept the fact that a general perspective on life makes sense, then we can also talk about there being “something it is like” to have a broad view.
Only focusing on the first part- the having a general perspective- and leaving out the detailed latter part would lead us to confusions when talking about the mind-body problem. How would we know the functioning and the relation of the mind and body? If we were to take Hacker’s way and dismiss the question on ‘what it is like’ for a human being to be a human being, then we could not come to general conclusions on the attitudes of life. By attitudes of life, I mean mental and emotional states such as optimism and pessimism. When we ask an optimist and pessimist the question “what is it like to be you?” he would answer as good or bad. The fact that we can get an answer to such a question even states the importance and relevance of this question. The difference in their opinion of what it is like for them to be them does not imply that the issue is subjective, but rather, it shows that if there is something it is like for an optimist or pessimist to be in a state in this world, then there is no reason to doubt that each can also have a state that identifies him to be him.
Based on his explanations, we can concur that Hacker does not only throw away the idea of Nagel and notes three features he calls ‘salient’ under which the topic may have a foundation. First, is the fact that “the subject term differs from the object term,” with which he poses the question: “What is it for Y to be X?” Here, Hacker is taking two different subject classes and trying to figure out the distinctive feature that separates the two. The second feature is that “they implicitly involve a contrast between the specified subject class and some other class that also falls within the domain of the object class.” (A Place For ‘Something It Is Like’ In Our Language, 3) Thus the question arises, ‘What is it like for Y, as opposed to Z, to be X?’ Again here, we have two different subjects being compared under one object. The last feature is again a comparison by referring to the object class. Hence the question could be formulated as; What is it for Y, to be X as opposed to something else Y might have been?’
Hacker is of the opinion that Nagel’s question does not include the three salient features and hence constitutes a question that is apparent and has no sense. According to Hacker, Nagel’s question “What is it like to be a bat?” leaves out the important element of comparison that will pave the way for the answer. Hacker analyses this question and transforms it into a form as such: “What is it like for a bat to be a bat?”, Hence creating confusion because you cannot ask a bat, as opposed to a bat, what it is like to be a bat. According to Hacker, the subject class of this question is identical to its object class. In so far as the creature in the question is an X, it makes no sense to imply that it could have been some other sort of creature. As Hacker puts it: “there is no other creature a bat might be, other than a bat.” Although this elaboration of Hacker’s makes sense, there is still a little problem when he says “There is nothing other than a bat which might be a bat.” If we consider a situation in which the animal we see is a bird, it will not make sense to say that it is a bat. But if we look from a more generalized point of view to the sentient creatures, we can fall into doubt whether the animal is or is not a bat. This then generates a problem for Hacker’s argument that the question “What is it like to be a bat?” makes no sense. The main point here seems to be that, even though Hacker’s question “What is it like for a bat to be a bat?” makes no sense, the question “What is it like for a sentient creature to be a bat or a bird, etc.?” can be put into consideration. The second question shows last two of the salient features, in the sense that the answer would be a comparison of two animals from the sentient class. This comparison would exhibit the qualities and traits of these animals that make these animals what they are. From this broad point of view, Hacker’s argument that questioning what it is like is unnecessary and doesn’t make sense seems to be doubtful.
My second argument in this paper aims to resolve the dispute between the two famous philosophers. Although, according to Nagel, we cannot know what it is like for each; and although, according to Hacker, such a question of what it is like to be a human makes no sense; there is something that can identify an individual, and that is called the cooperation of the soul and the conscious. The soul, in my opinion, is what makes an individual unique; because each has a different soul. Some qualities make up this uniqueness of the soul, and the first one is consciousness. It is the conscious state that allows an individual to make rational decisions and it is the soul that allows the individual to be in a mental and emotional state. So to understand what it is like for a bat to be a bat, we need to look at the conscious states of the bat. Understanding these states would give us an idea about the mindset of the bat.
In the same way; understanding the way the human brain functions would give us an idea of what it is like for an individual to be that individual. An example would be a soldier. If we were to examine the behavior, language, attitude, feeling, normal life of a soldier; we would possibly be able to get an idea of how the soldier thinks and why he thinks in that way. This then would allow us to make observations and come to conclusions about what it is like for that soldier to be a soldier. The cooperation of the soul and the mind, in this sense, is essential and helpful in resolving the disagreement.
The disagreement between Nagel and Hacker can also be related to the long-running debate of Nature vs. Nurture; where Nagel’s idea would be categorized under innatism because he talks about something an individual has within that makes the individual what it is. And Hacker’s view would then be the nurtured category because Hacker’s idea is more closely related to understanding and learning through comparing and contrasting. But that is a topic for another paper.
In conclusion; if we are to think about the broader understanding of life and question the very essence of beings, it would not be nonsensical to say that there is something that makes each subject class what they are. From a Darwinian point of view, natural selection would be an excellent example in explaining the blending features of how X came about. However, from a Neo-Darwinian point of view, natural selection would be insufficient by itself and would require transmission of characteristics from parent to offspring through genetic transfer. In this sense, there would be a comparison of X with Y. While the former may be plausible for Nagel’s idea, the latter seems closer to Hacker’s. My point here is that to get a broad perspective of the creation and evolution (in the opinion of some people), we will need a more specific and detailed analysis of the features that make up this perspective. In this sense, asking a question such as “What it is like to be a bat” may be important in coming to an understanding of the species mammals and their distinctive features.
Bibliography
Burley, Mikel. A Place For ‘Something It Is Lıke’ In Our Language. Philosophical Writings. 35. Summer 2007
Hacker, P.M.S. Is There Anything It Is Like To Be A Bat. Philosophy, 77 (300):157-174. 2002Nagel, Thomas. What It Is Lıke To Be A Bat. Princeton University: Philosophical Review 83:435-450. October 1974